Purpose: the purpose of this paper is to explore how …rms organize to engage in non-market strategy.
Introduction
One of the most important points to be made up front is that there is no single universally accepted method for designing a CSR structureBusiness for Social Responsibility (2002) How a …rm organizes is a fundamentally important question. There has been a plethora of work exploring how to organize a …rm in terms of what belongs in and outside of a particular …rm. Early work includes Coase (1937) , Williamson (1975) , and Grossman and Hart (1986) . More recently, the growing …eld of organizational economics has focused on organizing within a …rm. Primary areas of exploration have included corporate hierarchy (e.g., Garicano (2000) , Harris and Raviv (2002) , and Alonso, Dessein, and Matouschek (2008)), task design (e.g., Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , Laux (2001) , and Schottner (2008)), delegation (e.g., , Prendergast (1995) , and Krishna and Morgan (2008) ), and incentive design (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for a survey). This paper continues in this stream of literature by exploring how to organize non-market activities within a …rm. As will be discussed, there is clear heterogeneity in how …rms currently organize nonmarket operations. The purpose of this paper is to propose a typology not only to help identify di¤erent types of non-market organizational structures, but also to understand why di¤erent organizational structures arise.
Non-market strategy is a broad term that refers to a …rm's activities outside of the marketplace that can help it gain competitive advantage (Baron (2009) ). This includes both public politics strategies (e.g., lobbying and engaging with regulators) and private politics strategies (e.g., engaging with activists). Meanwhile, corporate social responsibility (CSR) can be a part of both of these types of political strategies. CSR can be used to increase returns to lobbying and prevent or soften future regulation (e.g., Lyon (2004) , Baron (2009) , Minor and Morgan (2011) , Hong and Minor (2014) ). CSR can also be used to appease activists and possibly avoid future adverse activist actions (e.g., see Godfrey (2005) , Barnett (2007) , and Baron (2009) ). Typically, …rms do not have a division called "non-market" strategy. Instead, …rms have divisions that carry out some of these non-market strategy functions, but these groups are often referred to as Corporate Social Responsibility, Sustainability, or some similar name. Consequently, for this paper, we will focus on CSR divisions to help illuminate how …rms organize their non-market strategy functions-though we do consider the organizational consequences of adding non-CSR elements to a CSR group in Section (). For the balance of the paper, we refer to non-market strategy organization as organizing CSR strategy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the …rst paper to explicitly explore the organization of these groups.
We begin in the next section by developing a typology of four types of CSR strategy organization. We then use four …rms to illustrate these categorizations. This qualitative analysis motivates our next section, where we utilize organizational economics to explore when a …rm should choose a particular CSR strategy organizational form. In particular, we develop a model where a …rm must decide on organizing market strategy activities and non-market strategy activities in separate units versus having both units engage in both activities. There is a trade-o¤ in this decision in that there is an opportunity cost for a single unit to engage in both activities; however, when both units engage in both activities, the …rm receives outputs on both domains from two units as opposed to a single output towards each domain from a single, specialized unit. In this sense, the model is related to the extant multi-tasking literature (see Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) , Laux (2001) , and Prendergast (2002)). However, there are some additional elements that distinguish it from this literature. First, it is assumed that there are some complementarities between market and non-market strategy activities. That is, engaging in one activity can help the performance of the other. Second, and more novel, is that there are externalities in our model, since we are dealing with (possible) social output. In particular, both the manager and the …rm may value CSR beyond its ability to enhance …nancial performance. This introduces the possibility of di¤erent outcomes organizationally than if such externalities were not present.
We …nd that the organization of the …rm is generally non-monotonic in the importance of CSR to the …rm-where importance comes from the degree of …nancial and social performance complementarities, the …rm's value of CSR, and the manager's value of CSR. In particular, for low and high values of CSR importance, it is best for the …rm to integrate its CSR strategy-business units should be engaged in both market and non-market activities. However, for intermediate values of CSR importance, it is best for the …rm to organize CSR strategy activity into a standalone business unit that specializes in CSR activities. The intuition is as follows. For high-importance CSR settings, the synergy of CSR and …nancial performance overcomes the (potentially high) cost of multi-tasking within a business unit. In contrast, for low-value CSR …rms, the return to having two units both work on market strategy activities overcomes the multi-tasking cost, which is small since business units minimally engage in CSR when it is not very important. However, for intermediate values of CSR, these forces net out in the opposite direction: CSR strategy activities are su¢ ciently valuable to warrant a signi…cant level of activity, but not valuable enough to overcome the (increased) cost of distracting a unit from market strategy activities. Hence, having CSR strategy activities located in a specialized CSR unit is the best organizational design for this setting.
Related to our study is the organizational design literature using agent-based simulation. Owing to the di¢ culty of …nding closed-form solutions in the analysis of organizational design while using multiple variables, some have used agent-based simulation to generate large-sample-size numerical examples to provide evidence of optimal organizational design. For a recent example of this technique, see Claussen, Kretschmer, and Stieglitz (2014). They study the trade-o¤ of commitment and ‡exibility within an organization. Similarly Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) explore the trade-o¤ of organizational search and stability. Siggelkow and Rivkin (2005) extends Rivkin and Siggelkow (2003) to allow for dynamic environments. Given a particular distributions of decisions across managers or departments, these papers focus on how the primitives of the model predict which organizational form converges to a superior (i.e., locally optimal) performance level. In contrast, this current paper focuses on how to get the distribution of choices right when a particular manager might also be making choices on the same dimensions as another manager or business unit. In addition, these agent-based simulations generally assume mean zero performance complementarities between di¤erent decision dimensions, as payo¤s are randomly assigned assuming iid. That is, they do not explicitly consider the case where, for example, a non-market strategy can have a systematic bias to enhance market strategy. Finally, all choices in these models are binary, which disallows the analysis of magnitudes of choices and their relationship to organizational form. Thus, this paper complements this strand of literature by exploring aspects of organizational design that are not the focus of the extant papers. This paper also complements these organizational design papers by explicitly analyzing …rm-level non-market strategy choice and implementation. Baron (2015) argues that more attention should be given to this level of non-market strategy analysis.
We now begin with our typology.
A Typology of Non-Market Organization
Based on personal discussions with senior executives of CSR units at several SP500 …rms and data obtained from 2013 sustainability reports available on company websites, we identi…ed two primary dimensions that di¤erentiate CSR units. One dimension is the degree of integration of a …rm's CSR unit across the rest of the organization. One measure of the degree of integration is to what extent the …rm has a particular business group specialize in CSR strategy activities. Another marker of the degree of integration is how many levels of the organizational hierarchy decide on CSR strategies. Some …rms concentrate almost all decisions in the C-suite, whereas others tend to push decisions all the way down to front-line employees. In an intermediate form of CSR integration, each separate business unit acts as a separate division in terms of deciding on CSR strategy; however, these decisions primarily take place at the head of the respective business unit. The degree of integration of CSR activities can then be conceptualized as the procedure of the …rm's CSR activities. On one end of the spectrum of integration, a company like Intel embeds its CSR activities within and across all of its business units. It also incentivizes all of its workers to engage in sustainability: "Intel links a portion of every employee's variable compensation-from front-line sta¤ to our CEO-to environmental sustainability metrics." On the other end of the integration spectrum is a company like Starbucks. In 1999, Starbucks formed a stand-alone CSR department. This department is led by a Senior Vice President who focuses on business practices, environmental issues, community a¤airs, corporate giving, and the Starbucks Foundation. The CSR unit operates similarly to any other important business unit of the …rm. Thus, whereas Intel has to a large degree integrated its CSR strategy making throughout its organization, Starbucks has a separate division that specializes in CSR strategy making.
A second dimension di¤erentiating CSR units is the degree of pro…t alignment in their CSR activities. Some types of CSR, such as some energy costs savings measures, simply pay for themselves …nancially. Another example is consumer-facing …rms that engage in CSR and in response enjoy an increase in customer sales that exceed such CSR costs. These types of CSR would be appropriate in a Milton Friedman world of CSR, where a manager's sole responsibility is to maximize the pro…ts of the …rm (Friedman (1970) ). However, other types of CSR are not expected to generate a full …nancial return of its cost. One feature of this latter type of CSR is that it is often is not well related to the market strategy activities of the …rm. Another feature is that the CSR may be done in such a way that it is di¢ cult to recoup many of the costs. Thus, this second dimension can be conceptualized as the purpose of the …rm's CSR activities.
On one extreme towards CSR pro…t alignment, there is Halliburton, which although it appears in the 2013 Dow Jones Sustainability Index, lists "…nancial Performance" as the primary reason for its CSR e¤orts. In its sustainability report, Halliburton further explains that its CSR issues impact "shareholder value and are, therefore, important" to the company. On the other end of the spectrum is Patagonia, which reorganized under a Bene…t Corporation charter to make legally explicit its objective of social performance and that it is not maximizing shareholder value based solely on …nancial outcomes.
From these two dimensions, we can now map CSR organizational forms into four types. We denote a …rm that is pro…t centric in its CSR and has its CSR strategic activities largely carried out by a specialized business unit as Strategic. These …rms are generally engaging in CSR primarily for pro…t and are implementing their CSR activities by means of this stand-alone CSR business unit. At the other extreme of both dimensions is the organizational form we call Mission. Firms in this category are engaging in CSR from less of a pro…t motive. An additional sign of this type of organizational form is that the CSR activities are devised and engaged in at possibly all levels of the …rm. Most bene…t corporations would also …t in this category.
In contrast, those …rms that disperse their CSR strategic activities broadly throughout the organization but are more pro…t driven in their CSR pursuits are categorized as Integrated. Finally, the opposite CSR organizational form of Integrated is Foundation. These …rms carry out CSR activities in a more stand-alone-unit fashion and are not purely pro…t driven in their CSR.
In Figure 1 , we plot four …rms according to this CSR organization typology:
Of course, in practice, there are degrees of integration and degrees of pro…t centered-ness. Thus, if we plotted a variety of …rms, they would portray a dis-tribution of outcomes. In this spirit, we randomly selected a sample of 24 companies from the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. We then hand collected data from each …rm's most recent sustainability report and graded them on each dimension of our typology. 1 In addition to these DJSI companies, we added Patagonia as an example of a bene…t corporation, and a far north-east reference point, creating a total sample of 25 …rms. In Figure 2 , we report the results of this qualitative analysis. We then divide the resultant space into quadrants to map these …rms into our typology introduced with Figure 1 . It should also be noted that this chart represents …rms'stated organizational form. We are unable to test the actual organizational form of all of these …rms. However, there is some comfort in knowing that for those …rms for which we interviewed top executives, we found similar proclamations from the executives as those in their sustainability reports.
Although an exact plotting is admittedly subjective, it is apparent from this chart that there is heterogeneity across …rms. We next turn to identifying the environments in which a …rm should operate by means of a given organizational form to illuminate the origins of this heterogeneity.
Model
To model the problem of organizational design, we assume that the …rm chooses integration or specialization for two units, or groups. 2 Integration means that both units will perform both market and non-market activities. Specialization means that one unit handles only market activities and the other handles non-market activities.
To match the reality that much of the non-market activity at …rms that have a nonmarket-speci…c unit involves corporate social responsibility activities, and to simplify exposition, we refer to non-market activities in the model as CSR. For simplicity and to abstract away from a team problem, we refer to each unit interchangeably as a "manager." In particular, we consider two risk-neutral managers, 1 and 2; each managing its respective unit. The …rm uses business units 1 and 2 to collectively implement a level of CSR activity indexed by level S and a level of market activity indexed by level M:
3 Hence, we explicitly consider both market and non-market choices without taking the other as given, as is often the case in the extant literature (see Baron (2015) ). Total output Y is a function of both of these factors and is written as
where M = M 1 + M 2 , S = S 1 + S 2 ; and 2 R + captures CSR output's contribution to overall output. 4 Thus, measures how important CSR is in the …rm's production process. For example, a …rm that faces consumers who place a greater value on CSR, enjoys a greater : In contrast, when = 0; CSR activities do not help the production process at all. We de not consider < 0: This would mean that a …rm is engaging in CSR that hurts overall …rm performance. A …rm should not engage in this type of CSR. Note that overall …rm performance can also mean social performance in addition to …nancial performance (see section ()).
It is costly to implement activities, and this cost is a function of the level of activity. In particular, a manager's cost of production is
for manager i 2 f1; 2g: The parameter 2 R captures the degree of economy of scope of a manger's production process. In particular, when 0 < < 1; as commonly assumed (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) ), increasing one level of production increases the marginal cost of an additional unit of production on both dimensions. This case can be thought of as a negative e¤ort spillover from one task to another; as one becomes exhausted from one activity, increasing activity on either dimension is more costly. If instead, < 0; increasing production on one dimension, reduces the cost of increased production on the other dimension. For example, if engaging in more CSR enabled a manager to produce market activities more cheaply, then < 0: This could also be thought of as a learning spillover e¤ect: as one becomes better at CSR, one can more e¤ectively generate market output (and or vice versa).
Finally, if = 0; then there is no di¤erence between having one worker do two tasks or two workers each do one task. In other words, any link between tasks is assumed away.
Manager i's payo¤s are
where i is the manager's …nancial payment, 5 which is calculated as share of total output, and 2 R + is a manager's valuation of personally producing CSR. With this latter term, we allow for a manager to be intrinsically motivated to produce some level of CSR. We will assume that i : This means that managers receive no less …nancial bene…t from market activities than utility from social activities. Recall that our analysis is focusing on pro…t seeking …rms and their workers. However, we will later consider …rms that care about CSR beyond its contribution to total output in section (), as well as managers with high values of > i in section (). With these basic ingredients we can identify the manager's activity-level choices as a function of organizational form.
Integration
Assuming the managers are engaged in both market and CSR activities in their respective units, we obtain the following production levels: We then calculate the total market output as
and social output as
Thus, total output is
Specialization
When managers only engage in one activity, we get the following outputs, assuming manager 1 does M and manager 2 does S:
Lemma 2 If manager 1 engages in market activity and manager 2 engages in CSR activity, outputs are M 1 = 1 and S 2 = 2 + :
Proof: See Appendix. Thus, the …rm's total output is simply
The next natural question is, when does a …rm prefer specialization to integration? Fortunately, the analysis is simpli…ed in that we do not need to worry about comparing pro…tability or net output of di¤erent organizational forms but instead we can simply compare which form provides the greatest output, as given by our next Lemma.
Lemma 3 If Y integrated > (<) Y specialized , integration (specialization) is the optimal organizational form.
Proof: See Appendix. We now use this Lemma to identify when one organizational form is preferred to another.
Optimal Organizational Form
The optimal organizational form then depends on the primitives of the model. We will consider each primitive in turn in order to identify when …rms should choose one organizational form over another.
Economy of Scope
First consider the case as economy of scope approaches zero (i.e., ! 0): Then, we have
This means that integrated generates greater total output than specialized. Intuitively, when there is su¢ cient economies of scope across both activities, having both units engage in both strategies dominates being specialized, since two rather than one units generate similar levels of output on both dimensions. Similarly, and more extreme, is when 2 ( 1; 0): Here, Y integrated is further increased compared to when = 0; while Y specialized does not change, thus we still have Y integrated > Y specialized : That is, if a manager becomes more e¤ective in engaging in one activity because of engaging in the other, then market and CSR activities should naturally be integrated within the organization. In contrast, as ! +1; it can be shown that the inequality becomes the opposite: specialized is the preferred organizational form. Intuitively, when it becomes costly enough to engage in both activities simultaneously, the …rm is better o¤ having specialized units; one business unit should specialize in CSR activities and the other in market activities. We label this increased cost as the multi-tasking cost. To explore the e¤ects of the other model parameters, we now consider, as commonly assumed (see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) ), more moderate economy of scopes, such that 0 < < 1:
Importance of CSR for Output
Recall that measures how much CSR activities contribute to overall output. First consider the case when CSR is not very important in the production process (i.e., as ! 0): Then, we have
and Y specialized = 1 : Since i and < 1; we have Y integrated > Y specialized ; and the …rm will choose to have integrated units. 7 When CSR matters little in total output, the manager is also receiving very little incentive to participate in CSR since she is paid a share of output; thus, she will choose relatively little CSR investment. This also means there will be little multitasking cost to o¤set the advantage of having both units engage in both activities, yielding greater output from units being integrated. In short, when CSR does not matter, it makes little sense to have a separate unit engaging in CSR activities. If instead CSR activities are very important in producing output (i.e., as ! +1); it is also the case that Y integrated > Y specialized : Here, the synergy of CSR activities and market activities in generating output overcomes any multi-tasking cost of having managers engage in both activities. In practice, this means that when non-market activities are important for market performance, it is critical to have the market and non-market strategies integrated locally, which is best achieved by forcing business units to engage in both types of activities. is true: Y integrated < Y specialized . Intuitively, there are two forces that determine the overall output of a …rm with an integrated organizational form: the importance of CSR to overall output and the cost of multi-tasking : When the multi-tasking cost of a manager engaging in both CSR and market activities is su¢ ciently greater relative to the bene…t it provides to overall output, increased importance of CSR (i.e., increased ) still induces the integrated …rm to produce more CSR. However, this greater CSR production is done with relatively poor e¢ ciency due to a higher , which yields a reduction in overall output for such a …rm. Eventually, however, CSR is valuable enough to production that it adequately o¤sets the multi-tasking cost ; which yields an increase in overall output as the increased importance of CSR (i.e., increased ) induces greater …rm production of it. 9 Meanwhile, a specialized organizational form does not face such a tradeo¤, as each unit only engages in only one activity, thus avoiding a multi-tasking cost . Hence, Y specialized is always increasing in : Consequently, the relative advantage (or disadvantage) of the integrated organizational form compared to the specialized organizational form is then U-shaped in the importance of CSR the …rm's production process.
For 9 Formally, this can be seen by noting that Y integrated is …rst decreasing and then increasing in : In particular, we see that
If we …x su¢ ciently greater than 0 (note that : Given a level of ; the blue, dashed line is the output from the organizational form of integrated, whereas the red, solid line is the output from the organizational form of specialized. Whichever organizational-form output is higher identi…es the preferred organizational form. Thus, for the gray region, which is approximately 2 (:25; :85); specialized is preferred. Otherwise, integrated provides superior total output.
Manager Valuation of CSR
Now consider increasing . We …nd that as ! 1; Y integrated > Y specialized if and only if >
1+
2 : Thus, if CSR is su¢ ciently important in the production process, then given the manager cares enough about CSR, integration is preferred. In this case, the …rm and managers are aligned in producing higher levels of both market and CSR activities. Otherwise, if CSR is not as important, and given the manager cares enough about CSR, specialization is preferred. Intuitively, if a manager cares a lot about CSR, but CSR is not that important for production, the …rm is better o¤ having that manager produce CSR alone rather than having both managers simultaneously engaging in CSR.
Firm Valuation of CSR
Now we consider the case where the …rm values CSR beyond its contribution to output. In particular, assume that the …rm's objective is to maximize
where is the …rm's additional valuation of social output over its value to …nancial output. However, note that we can rewrite this as
where e = + : Hence, our previous analysis of applies here as well. That is, we witness a U-shaped relationship between the relative advantage of integrated compared with specialized as a function of the …rm's valuation of CSR.
Non-CSR non-market functions
Those …rms with substantial non-market activities divorced from CSR strategy can also be nested within our model and typology. These non-CSR non-market activities generally include actions such as in ‡uencing legislation, in ‡uencing regulations, and litigation actions (see Baron (2009) ). If we assume a manager does not value their personal engagement in these activities outside of its value in increasing …nancial performance, we simply set manager non-market production valuation = 0: Now consider what happens when = 0; this yields
As can be shown, the inequality Y integrated > Y specialized always holds with = 0: In this world, under an integrated form, the manager provides the exact division of labor between market and CSR activities as preferred by the …rm. Since the …rm is receiving market activity level e¤ort from two managers rather than only one (i.e., when specialized), this double activity more than o¤sets the cost of multi-tasking. Here we are again assuming moderate multi-tasking costs of 0 < < 1: Of course, as shown in section () ; if is too great, the specialized organizational form will again dominate, even with = 0.
In practice, non-market strategy often entails both CSR and non-CSR non-market activities. Hence, for our model, we could rede…ne manager i's payo¤ as
where e = ; with 0 < < 1: The term then captures the fraction of nonmarket activities that are represented by CSR activities, for which manager i values her personal production at rate : With this new notation, we can reassess all of our previous analysis in terms of e ; manager i's e¤ective valuation of personal nonmarket activity production. For a given level of non-market activity, those …rms with a relatively high share of CSR activities (i.e., high ) and managers with high valuation of CSR activities (i.e., high ) are likely to be integrated, assuming su¢ cient returns to non-market strategy given the …rm's economy of scope (i.e., >
1+
2 ); as given by our previous analysis in section () :
Relating Theory to Organizational Form in Practice
In practice, as shown in Figure 2 , many (large) …rms have some degree of integrated organizational form rather than being fully integrated or fully specialized. We can conceive of …rms that are partially integrated and partially specialized as follows: consider a …rm that has a combination of integrated and specialized units. For example assume a …rm has 10 units. Di¤erent parts of the …rm could have di¤erent features (e.g., di¤erent values of and ) that dictate some units to be specialized and some to be integrated. Perhaps, the marketing unit is fully integrated and the …nance and operation units are specialized. On average, we would expect those …rms that have a greater total degree of …rm-wide ; to also have a greater degree of …rm-wide integration (i.e., have more integrated units), for example. Hence, with this conceptualization, we can still make predictions about the degree of integration as a function of …rm-wide parameters.
From section () ; we showed that the incidence of integrated organizational form is U-shaped in the degree that a …rm cares about CSR beyond any …nancial bene…t that it might yield. This suggests that the degree of integration should also be U-shaped in the degree a …rm cares about CSR beyond pro…ts.
We can then relate the pattern of the data from section () to our theoretical analysis. To do so, we …t a quadratic model to the 25 observations: In particular, we regress the degree of integration (i.e., integer values 1 through 10) on a quadratic equation of the degree of being less pro…t centric with CSR (i.e., integer values 1 through 10). In Figure 4 , we show the resulting estimated polynomial: With so few observations and the fact that the data was qualitatively obtained, we must view this chart with care and merely consider it suggestive, albeit consistent with our theory. In the end, the hope is that this paper's theoretical predictions will spur future rigorous, quantitative exploration into the organization of non-market strategy.
Once a …rm's degree of integrated form is determined, its second dimension, the importance of CSR beyond pro…ts, identi…es its placement in one of our four quadrants of our typology: From the analysis in the previous section, we expect the …rms where CSR has the greatest and least value to be integrated and thus to be Mission and Integrated …rms, respectively. In contrast, the …rms that are slightly more moderate in their valuation of CSR are predicted to fall either into the Strategy or Foundation category, depending on how important CSR is to them. Of course, if a …rm faces extremely great (or poor) economies of scope (i.e., low (high) multitasking costs), it will necessarily be integrated (or specialized). For these cases, it is also the …rm's value of CSR that determines its ultimate location in our typology. Hence, assuming a reasonable proportion of …rms with moderate economies of scope, we expect in practice the location of …rms in our typology to trace through the four quadrants in a U-shaped manner, as found in the suggestive chart above. The greater the proportion of …rms with moderate economies of scope, the greater the strength of the U-shape.
Conclusion
We created a typology for non-market organizational design. In particular, we identi…ed two dimensions of categorization: the degree that CSR activity is integrated with market activities within a …rm and the importance of CSR strategy in a …rm's production process. We dubbed these resulting four organizational types as Integrated, Strategic, Mission, and Foundation.
We then used a simple model to identify when …rms are likely to choose each of these organizational forms. Our primary …nding is that the relative advantage of …rms with integrated over specialized organizational forms is U-shaped in the importance of CSR: those …rms for which CSR has either a high or low level of importance-whether its because of the importance of CSR strategy on market outcomes, a …rm's value of CSR beyond its …nancial value, or a manager's high valuation of CSR-are most likely to choose an integrated organizational form, combining mar-ket and CSR activities throughout the …rm. In contrast, those …rms where CSR is moderately important in the production process are more likely to choose to specialize their CSR operations in a stand-alone business unit.
Empirical implications of these results are severalfold. First, once proxies for the importance of CSR to the …rm are identi…ed (i.e., measures of managerial valuation of CSR, measures of the degree of CSR complementaries with …nancial performance, and the preferences of the board of directors and shareholders concerning CSR), the U-shaped relationship between these and the probability of CSR integration can be assessed. Second, using a proxy for the proportion of non-CSR non-market activities (e.g., political contributions and lobbying) can be used to test an increase of such a proxy being associated with reduced incidence of CSR specialization. Third, measures of the economy of scope of a …rm should also predict organizational form. At the extreme, strong (poor) economies of scope predict integration (specialization).
We note that our analysis did not formally explore more than two divisions. Although we trust the intuition will carry over to n divisions, we leave this analysis to future research. Similarly, we did not simultaneously explore the joint e¤ects of myriad forces, as is typical of the agent-based simulation literature. This paper suggests future avenues of research by means of this methodology: numerical simulations could determine organizational outcomes based on the assumption that certain strategic activities are correlated in terms of payo¤s. This would be a departure from the standard approach of assuming iid draws of payo¤ pro…les. However, it could provide rich insights into the integration of market and non-market strategy and its implications on the organization of non-market strategy. and the manager's CSR choice becomes S 2 = 2 + :
QED.
By optimal organizational form we mean the greatest output net of the costs of creating such output (i.e., greatest "net output"). For the purely pro…t driven …rm (i.e., the …rm that does not care about CSR output beyond its contribution to …nancial performance), net output is simply …nancial pro…t. The net output derived from either non-market organizational form (i.e., integrated or specialized) is simply the share of output after paying managers for their e¤orts. Thus, we write the …rm's net output as a function of each organizational form as: of the types of organizational approaches …rms are currently taking when engaging in CSR by providing a simple, simultaneous snapshot of their e¤orts. From this analysis, it became clear that there is signi…cant heterogeneity on both dimensions of CSR purpose and procedure. This …nding motivated our theoretical analysis to help understand the origins of these di¤erences.
